Recovering Iraq\u27s Cultural Property:  What Can be Done to Prevent Illicit Trafficking by Zelig, Joshua M.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 8
2005
Recovering Iraq's Cultural Property: What Can be
Done to Prevent Illicit Trafficking
Joshua M. Zelig
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Joshua M. Zelig, Recovering Iraq's Cultural Property: What Can be Done to Prevent Illicit Trafficking, 31 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol31/iss1/8
  
RECOVERING IRAQ’S CULTURAL 
PROPERTY: WHAT CAN BE DONE TO 
PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
fter the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in April 2003, 
Iraqi citizens engaged in widespread looting.1 The lawlessness in 
the aftermath led looters to raid government buildings, libraries, schools, 
thousands of archaeological sites, and even burn down the National Li-
brary.2 The most publicized and controversial looting occurred at the 
Iraqi National Museum.3 United States forces were unable to secure the 
Museum until April 16, when tanks finally arrived.4 While initial reports 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Rajv Chandrasekaran, Our Heritage is Finished; Looters Destroyed What 
War Did Not, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2003, at A1. 
 2. See Phillip Kennicott, The Vanishing Past; Iraq’s Proud Library Turns to Bitter 
Ashes, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2003, at A1. 
 3. The looting created controversy because many critics of Coalition military plan-
ning argued that the protection of the Oil Ministry appeared to take priority at the time. 
See Catherine Phuong, The Protection of Iraqi Cultural Property, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
985, 985 (2004). Such charges of neglect even prompted the Chairman of the President’s 
Advisory Committee on Cultural Property, Martin E. Sullivan, to resign. Sullivan stated 
in his resignation: “While our military forces have displayed extraordinary precision and 
restraint in deploying arms—and apparently in securing the Oil Ministry and oil field—
they have been nothing short of impotent in failing to attend to the protection of [Iraq’s] 
cultural heritage.”  Paul Richard, Bush Panel Members Quit Over Looting; Cultural Ad-
visors Say U.S. Military Could Have Prevented Museum Losses, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 
2003, at C1. The United States military responded by arguing that given the history of the 
previous Gulf War, in which Saddam Hussein ordered the burning of oil fields, the pro-
tection of the Oil Ministry and the oil fields was a high priority. Additionally, the military 
claims that it was unable to secure the Museum because enemy fire was coming from the 
vicinity. Yaraslov Trofimov, Iraq After Hussein: Officials Say Iraq Looting Wasn’t as 
Bad as First Feared, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2003, at A8. 
 4. United States forces entered Baghdad on April 9, 2003. The looting began soon 
thereafter on April 10, 2003. See John F. Burns, Pillagers Strip Iraqi Museum of its 
Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at A1. Trofimov, writing about the inability to pro-
tect the museum, states the following: 
[The military] couldn’t move into the museum compound and protect it from 
looters last week because . . . soldiers were taking fire from the building and 
were determined not to respond. There is an Iraqi army trench in the Museum’s 
front lawn, and Lt. Col. Schwartz said his troops found many Iraqi Army uni-
forms inside. “If there is any dirty trick in the book,” he said, “they sure used 
it.” 
Id. 
A 
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estimated that over 170,000 pieces were missing from the Museum, this 
figure was later shown to be mistaken.5 Museum directors had taken it 
upon themselves to secure and hide most of the Museum items. How-
ever, looters did make off with over 13,000 items.6 Priceless ancient arti-
facts such as the Warka Vase were stolen from the Museum.7 An am-
nesty program initiated by the United States military proved to be some-
what successful and, by September 2003, over 3,000 pieces had been 
recovered including the Warka Vase.8 Through the efforts of a broad 
coalition of international organizations and countries, including the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,9 the 
International Criminal Police Organization,10 and the United States, as of 
June 2004, roughly 5,200 items had been recovered in six different coun-
                                                                                                             
 5. Over 170,000 artifacts were mistakenly reported missing after Saddam Hussein’s 
downfall. The estimate was so high because Western journalists arrived at the museum to 
find it virtually empty. Later on it was discovered that the museum staff had moved most 
of the artifacts into storage in anticipation of the looting. Roger Atwood, Stop Thieves! 
Recovering Iraq’s Looted Treasures, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at B2. 
 6. This figure was established by Colonel M. Bogdanos, the head of a thirteen mem-
ber team dispatched from United States Central Command, consisting of selected military 
personnel from the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group and agents from the Bureau 
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See Colonel Bogdanos’ Iraq Museum Investi-
gation [hereinafter Bogdanos Investigation], Apr. 22, 2003–Sept. 8, 2003, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2003/d20030922fr.pdf. 
 7. According to the Bogdanos Investigation, the Warka Vase is “an exquisite white 
limestone votive vase dating from approximately 3200 B.C.E. and arguably the most 
significant artifact possessed by the museum.” Id. 
 8. Almost half of these recovered items were returned by Iraqis under the amnesty 
program. Id. The amnesty program was created by Col. Bogdanos and his team. They met 
with local imams and community leaders to help them explain to Iraqis the extent of the 
amnesty program. The team initially struggled with the perception among the Iraqi peo-
ple of the Museum’s connection to the former Hussein regime and a lack of trust in the 
“no questions asked” policy. Bogdanos reports that eventually the program proved to be 
successful and Iraqis desired to return items to the U.S. forces for safekeeping until a new 
Iraqi government was installed. Id. 
 9. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
was founded on November 16, 1945, http://www.unesco.org (follow “About UNESCO” 
hyperlink). 
 10. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), created in 1923, is the 
world’s largest international police organization with 182 member countries. It facilitates 
cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities 
and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. Introduction to 
Interpol, http://www.interpol.net/Public/Icpo/introduction.asp. 
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tries.11 Despite these efforts, wide-spread instances of looting are still 
plaguing Iraq, particularly at archaeological sites throughout the south. 12 
The efforts of UNESCO, Interpol, and the many participating nations 
should be applauded and may be successful in the short term. However, 
the long term aspiration should be for more countries to join and enforce 
the existing treaties and conventions established to protect cultural prop-
erty during armed conflicts and prevent the illegal distribution of stolen 
cultural items. There are three such international agreements in place: 
The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict,13 the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Trans-
fer of Ownership of Cultural Property,14 and the 1995 UNIDROIT15 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.16 By in-
creasing the number of State Parties to these agreements, it may be easier 
to stop illicit trafficking of stolen goods by having a uniform customs 
and borders system. However, these Conventions have been virtually 
ineffective in dealing with the current crisis in Iraq. 
                                                                                                             
 11. For example, Italy has confiscated more than three hundred pieces looted from the 
Museum. Jordan, which has worked the hardest among Middle Eastern countries to pre-
vent itself from being used as a transshipment point, had seized 1,054 pieces by June 
2004. Atwood, supra note 5. 
 12. Charlotte Eagar writes about the ongoing problem of looting archaeological sites 
throughout Iraq: 
The real scandal is not theft from institutions, which are under 24-hour guard, 
but the plundering of Iraq’s most ancient archaeological sites. Freelance exca-
vators are hunting not for grand artifacts, but instead seals, inscriptions and 
earthenware—Iraqi treasures which still lie, undiscovered in the earth. 
Charlotte Eagar, On the Secret War to Save Iraq’s Heritage from Smugglers, TIMES 
(Eng.), Oct. 16, 2004, Weekend Rev., at 4. 
 13. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed 
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 14. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 10 I.L.M. 289 [hereinaf-
ter UNESCO Convention]. 
 15. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is an 
independent, intergovernmental organization based in Rome. The Institute was estab-
lished in 1926 by the League of Nations. Following the demise of the League, 
UNIDROIT was reestablished in 1940, on the basis of a multilateral agreement. About 
Unidroit, http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/main.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 
2005). 
 16. UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 
24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. 
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This Note will demonstrate that the Conventions and treaties estab-
lished for the protection of cultural property do little to remedy the crisis 
in Iraq. It will argue that the most effective way to curb illicit trafficking 
of cultural property is for States to not only join existing treaties but to 
implement stringent domestic legislation to eliminate a burgeoning mar-
ket for such goods.17 Furthermore, this Note will argue that because of 
the potential of further military intervention by the United States and the 
United Kingdom, it is necessary for these countries to join the 1954 
Hague Convention and its Protocols in order to prevent future disasters 
to cultural property. Part II of this Note will discuss the history of pro-
tecting cultural property, particularly in times of armed conflict. It will 
discuss the creation of UNESCO and examine the three existing Conven-
tions established to protect cultural property in times of both peace and 
war. Part III of this Note provides background on the history of looting 
and destruction of cultural property in the Middle East and then focuses 
on the widespread damage done throughout Iraq in the aftermath of the 
fall of Saddam Hussein. Part III will also examine the immediate interna-
tional response and its effectiveness. Part IV analyzes effectiveness of 
the three existing conventions and their applicability to the situation in 
Iraq. Part V discusses the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
requiring member states to implement legislation to prevent the illicit 
trafficking of Iraqi cultural property.18 It will argue that this is an effec-
tive technique and that strong domestic legislation is a useful remedy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Background of Protection of Cultural Property 
The first legal reference to the protection of cultural property during 
armed conflict can be found in the Instruction for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field,19 also known as the “Lieber 
                                                                                                             
 17. The United States has two bills currently proposed in both the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate. The Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act was introduced on May 
7, 2003 in the House, and the Senate proposed the Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cul-
tural Antiquities Act of 2003 on June 19, 2003. The United Kingdom adopted the Iraq 
Order 2003 on June 12, 2003.  See infra Part V. 
 18. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003. 
The Resolution required all Member States to take action to facilitate the return of Iraqi 
cultural property by enacting a ban on the transfer of such items.  See infra Part V. 
 19. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
promulgated as General Order No.100 by Abraham Lincoln, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter 
Lieber Code]. 
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Code.”20 Article 34 of the Lieber Code states that cultural property 
should be treated as private property unless used for a military purpose.21 
Artwork and other more traditional aspects of cultural property are pro-
tected under Article 35 of the Lieber Code.22 The Lieber Code is signifi-
cant in that it places the duty to protect cultural property on both the at-
tacker and the defender, and lays the foundation for subsequent interna-
tional treaties.23 
Concern over protecting private property during armed conflict gave 
rise to the first international treaties providing protection for cultural 
property, the 189924 and 190725 Hague Conventions which produced a 
codified rule of war.26 Both Conventions prohibit invading armies from 
pillaging and require them to respect the civil laws of the conquered ter-
ritory.27 Article 27 of the 1907 Convention provides that protection must 
be given to all religious, scientific, and historic monuments.28 Such 
                                                                                                             
 20. The code was prepared by Francis Lieber. Lieber was a German-American politi-
cal philosopher who, during the Civil War, authored the Instructions for the Government 
of Armies of the United States in the Field. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001–
2005). 
 21. Lieber Code art. 34 (“As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to 
hospitals, or other establishments of an exclusively charitable character, to establishments 
of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge, whether public schools, 
universities, academies of learning or observatories, museums of fine arts, or of a scien-
tific character—such property is not to be considered public property.”). 
 22. Lieber Code art. 35 (“Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or 
precious instruments . . . as well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable in-
jury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.”). 
 23. See David Keane, The Failure to Protect Cultural Property in Wartime, 14 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2004). 
 24. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803. The Convention was adopted at the First Hague Peace Conference in 
1899 and entered into force in 1900. 
 25. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277. 
 26. Andrea Cunning, The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War and 
Peace, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 211, 215 (2003) (“The concern over protecting 
private property became more of an international concern as a nation’s capability to con-
duct war was increased by many of the effects of the industrial revolution and warfare 
became more violent and destructive.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. 1907 Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land  art. 37 (“In 
sieges and bombardments, all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, 
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
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buildings or monuments are to be marked by visible signs.29 Aside from 
protection of military strikes against cultural property, Article 56 of the 
1907 Hague Convention also expressly forbids the seizure, destruction or 
willful damage of such property, and even provides for legal proceedings 
in case of a violation.30 Together, Articles 27 and 56 were designed to 
protect both the buildings and the cultural property within them. 
Although the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions failed to protect cul-
tural property during World War I, they were significant with respect to 
reparations. The Treaty of Versailles provided for the enforcement of the 
two Hague Conventions by requiring Germany to return to France all 
artwork and other cultural objects stolen during the course of the war.31 
Although there were no prosecutions for damaging cultural property after 
World War I, the acts of plunder and destruction were condemned as vio-
lations of international law.32 This condemnation, combined with restitu-
tion procedures after the conflict, represented significant steps toward a 
clearer vision of international protection of cultural property. Unfortu-
nately, wide-scale destruction and pillaging of cultural property occurred 
once again throughout World War II, further highlighting the need for 
more authoritative measures.33 
                                                                                                             
hospitals, and places where sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being 
used at the time for military purposes.”). 
 29. Id. (“It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or 
places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy before-
hand.”). 
 30. 1907 Hague Convention art. 56 (“All seizure of, destruction or willful damage 
done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is 
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.”). 
 31. Peace Treaty of Versailles art. 245, June 28, 1919 (“The German Government 
must restore to the French Government the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or 
works of art carried away from France by the German Authorities in the course of the war 
of 1870–1871 and during this last war . . . .”). 
 32. These acts were condemned as violations of international law in the sense that 
they were violations of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. The spirit of these two 
conventions was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles. “The principle of protection 
from the Hague Relations of 1899 and 1907 was given practical effect in the Treaty of 
Versailles, and the restitution of cultural property . . . represents an important advance-
ment.”  Keane, supra note 23, at 8. Additionally, the 1907 Convention was explicitly 
recognized as customary international law in 1946 by the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS OF THE LAWS OF WAR 
43 (2d ed. 1989). 
 33. Cunning, supra note 26, at 220. 
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B. History of UNESCO 
The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) was founded on November 16, 1945.34 Since its inception, 
UNESCO has worked diligently to protect the natural and cultural heri-
tage of humanity and prevent the illicit trafficking of cultural artifacts.35 
UNESCO conducted its first international campaign in 1959 when it 
helped the Egyptian government safeguard the Abu Simel temples in the 
Nile Valley from flooding.36 UNESCO has built a legal foundation for its 
cultural action, beginning with the creation of the Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict in 
1954,37 followed by the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cul-
tural Property in 1970.38 UNESCO also helped create the UNIDROIT 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects in 1995.39 
UNESCO responded almost immediately to the antiquities crisis in Iraq 
                                                                                                             
 34. Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion art. 1, Nov. 16, 1945, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO 
=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (“The purpose of the organization is to con-
tribute peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through educa-
tion, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of 
law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peo-
ples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of 
the United Nations.”). 
 35. Sarah Cattan, The Imperiled Past: Appreciating Our Cultural Heritage, UN 
CHRONICLE, Dec. 2003/Feb. 2004, at 7–12; see also UNESCO Constitution art. 1 § 2(c) 
(“By assuring the conservation and protection of the world’s inheritance of books, works 
of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned 
the necessary international conventions.”). 
 36. Cattan discusses UNESCO’s first effort at preserving cultural property in Egypt: 
These treasures of ancient Egyptian civilization were threatened by flooding 
caused by the destruction of the Aswan High Dam. With some fifty countries 
donating half of the $80 million necessary for the rescue, the campaign was an 
unexpected success. The temples were dismantled, moved to dry ground, reas-
sembled and eventually saved. This demonstrated that the conservation of the 
world’s common heritage concerned all countries and encouraged UNESCO to 
give legal support to the global movement. 
Cattan, supra note 35, at 7. 
 37. The Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, adopted at The Hague in 1954 in the wake of massive destruction of the cultural 
heritage in the Second World War, is the first international agreement focusing exclu-
sively on the protection of cultural heritage. Hague Convention, supra note 13. 
 38. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14. 
 39. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16. 
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by working together with the United States, Interpol, and many other 
organizations to restore Iraq’s cultural heritage.40 
C. 1954 Hague Convention 
The large-scale destruction and looting during World War II41 
prompted a need for a protective treaty for the tangible remains of both 
ancient and modern cultures.42 The Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was implemented by 
UNESCO in 1954 to protect cultural heritage in war-torn countries.43 The 
express purpose of the Hague Convention was to prevent the types of 
destruction and theft of cultural material that have become common in 
modern warfare.44 The Hague Convention was based on the premise that 
cultural property is significant to all human kind and is therefore deserv-
ing of appreciation and protection.45 The Hague Convention was unique 
in that it was the first international document to define the term “cultural 
property.”46 
                                                                                                             
 40. See Matthew Rose, Paradise Lost, ART & ANTIQUITIES, Summer 2003, at 86–87. 
 41. See Keane, supra note 23, at 8–12 (discussing the “system of organized plunder 
of both public and private property throughout the invaded countries of Europe during 
World War II.”  The Nazis stole more than 21,000 art objects from museums, libraries, 
and private homes). 
 42. Jennifer Lehman, The Continued Struggle With Stolen Cultural Property: The 
Hague Convention, The UNESCO Convention, and the UNIDROIT Draft Convention, 14 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 531 (1997). 
 43. Cattan, supra note 35. 
 44. Neil Brodie, Focus on Iraq: Spoils of War, ARCHAEOLOGY, July/August 2003. 
Mr. Brodie believes that this is a “strong piece of legislation” that, if acceded to, would 
circumvent many looting problems created by warfare. 
 45. Lehman, supra note 42, at 532. See also Hague Convention, supra note 13, pmbl. 
(“Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever 
means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contri-
bution to the world.”).  
 46. Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 1, defines cultural property as: 
 
a.  movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heri-
tage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, 
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings 
which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manu-
scripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical, or archaeological in-
terest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books 
or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above; 
 b.  buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit 
the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as 
museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges in-
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The Hague Convention imposes upon states a minimum standard of re-
spect for cultural property both in their territory47 and the territory of 
others. The main obligation imposed on parties is to prohibit and prevent 
any form of theft, pillage, vandalism, or misappropriation of cultural 
property.48 The most significant part of the Hague Convention concerns 
the responsibility of armed forces to protect the cultural property of other 
territories.49 An occupying power’s duty to protect cultural property and 
prevent illicit trade applies whether or not the occupied country has 
signed the convention.50 Furthermore, even if an occupied country has 
failed to protect its own cultural property as required under Article 3, the 
occupier must still take all necessary measures to protect that property.51 
This obligation emphasizes the global responsibility for cultural prop-
erty, not just the relation between a certain state and its property.52 
Although the Convention effectively promotes awareness and respect 
for cultural property during military conflicts, it does not adequately ad-
dress the illicit trafficking of such items during peacetime nor does it 
provide any remedies for their return.53 Another problem is the lack of 
any true enforcement measures. This is illustrated by the fact that State 
Parties, while called on to prosecute and impose penal sanctions on vio-
lators, are left to create their own laws and punishments.54 This leads to 
an inconsistency of domestic laws and systems that prosecute the damag-
                                                                                                             
tended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural 
property defined in sub-paragraph (a); 
 c.   centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in 
sub-paragraph (a) and (b), to be known as “centers containing 
monuments.” 
 
 47. Id. art. 4(3). 
 48. Id. art. 4(3). 
 49. Id. arts. 4–7. 
 50. Id. art. 5. 
 51. Id. art. 4 (the obligations under Article 4 may never be disregarded by any signing 
member). 
 52. Lehman, supra note 42, at 534. 
 53. Id. at 535. 
 54. Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 28, states: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the framework of their 
ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose pe-
nal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who 
commit or order to be committed a breach of the present Convention. 
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ing and trafficking of cultural property.55 Subsequent treaties have at-
tempted to solve these deficiencies. Although the Hague Convention cur-
rently has 114 State Parties, the United States and the United Kingdom 
are both conspicuously absent.56 The United States and United Kingdom 
have both refused to ratify the convention since 1954 because the Hague 
Convention would limit their capacity to use nuclear weapons.57 Even 
without the United States and the United Kingdom, the Hague Conven-
tion draws a significant following throughout the world with the help of 
UNESCO and other world organizations.58 
In response to barbaric acts against cultural property that occurred dur-
ing armed conflicts in the late 1980s and early 1990s,59 UNESCO initi-
                                                                                                             
 55. When every state has different laws concerning cultural property, the inconsis-
tency creates a chaotic system where traffickers can work in countries with more lenient 
legislation. 
 56. For a list of 114 State Parties to the Hague Convention, http://portal.unesco.org/la/ 
convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E&order=alpha. See also Cunning, supra note 26, 
at 220 (“The United States and the United Kingdom did not ratify the 1954 Hague Con-
vention because of its restrictiveness and stretch beyond customary international law.”). 
 57. Lehman, supra note 42, at 532. 
 58. Id. Parties to the Hague Convention include approximately one-half of the mem-
bers of UNESCO, including nearly all other NATO states. 
 59. Keane notes that “[t]he initiative for the Second Protocol came largely out of the 
destruction of cultural property during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.”  Keane, 
supra note 23, at 36. Keane argues that the 1954 Hague Convention was proved to be 
inadequate by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a High Contracting 
Party of the 1954 Hague Convention. Under Article 19 of the Hague Convention, a High 
Contracting Party is bound to the provisions of the Convention that respect cultural prop-
erty. Keane writes: 
Indeed, it is clear that cultural property was the subject of deliberate attack 
throughout the conflict. In response to charges of deliberate destruction of cul-
tural property, the Yugoslav federal government claimed its attacks were justi-
fied under military necessity. Similarly, the Serbs cited the defense of impera-
tive military necessity for the shelling of Dubrovnik. They claimed that Croats 
were using buildings in the city center for military purposes. Such use is pro-
hibited by the 1954 Hague Convention under the requirement of respect for cul-
tural property contained in Article 4. 
Id. at 22. Additional damage was done to religious sites, which are not protected under 
the 1954 Hague Convention. Thirty percent of the city of Dubrovnik’s historic center was 
destroyed in attacks on December 6, 1991. The practice of targeting religious institutions 
and cultural property was part of an “ethnic cleansing” campaign conducted by the Serbs. 
After hostilities ceased, the United Nations established a war crimes tribunal, the Statute 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which recognized the 
destruction of cultural property as a violation of international law. The ICTY handed 
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ated a review of the Hague Convention to improve its perceived defi-
ciencies.60 This review began in 1991 in order to create a new agreement 
to improve the Hague Convention by taking into account the experience 
gained from conflicts and the development of cultural property law since 
1945.61 The result was the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, 
adopted at a Diplomatic Conference held at The Hague in 1999.62 The 
Second Protocol elaborates the goals of the Hague Convention and 
makes attempts to further protect cultural property.63 More specifically, 
the Second Protocol creates a new form of “enhanced protection” for 
cultural property.64 The system of enhanced protection in the Second 
Protocol removes the geographical restrictions of the 1954 Hague Con-
vention by allowing for protection of cultural property located near in-
dustrial centers.65 The Second Protocol also establishes a common fund 
                                                                                                             
down two indictments for the destruction of cultural property against two high ranking 
Serbian officials, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. Id. 
 60. Five areas were identified by UNESCO to be addressed in the Second Protocol: 
(1) the institutional aspects, (2) the precautionary measures taken in peace time, (3) the 
“military necessity” exception, (4) the system of special protection, and (5) individual 
criminal responsibility. Id. at 27. 
 61. Legal Protection for Cultural Heritage: Protection for Cultural Property in the 
Event of an Armed Conflict, http://www.unesco.org/culture/legalprotection/war/html_ 
eng/index_en.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict pmbl., Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769, 769 [here-
inafter Second Protocol] (“Reaffirming the importance of the provisions of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, done at the 
Hague May 14, 1954, and emphasizing the necessity to supplement these provisions 
through measures to reinforce their implementation.”). 
 64. Cultural property achieves enhanced protection if it is vital to humankind, is pro-
tected by domestic law, and is not used for military purposes. Id.  Second Protocol, supra 
note 63, art. 10 states: 
Cultural property may be placed under enhanced protection provided that it 
meets the following three conditions: 
a. it is cultural heritage of the greatest importance to humanity; 
b. it is protected by adequate domestic legal and administrative     
measures recognizing its exceptional cultural and historic value 
and  ensuring the highest level of protection; 
c. it is not used for military purposes or to shield military sites and 
a declaration has been made by the Party which has control over 
the cultural property, confirming that it will not be so used. 
 
 65. The restrictions are articulated in the Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 
8(1)(a): 
300 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:1 
 
to provide financial assistance to State Parties for the protection of cul-
tural property during both times of peace and armed conflicts.66 This 
provision has enormous potential to combat the destruction of cultural 
heritage because many poor nations that lack the financial resources to 
protect their cultural property can draw upon the fund established by the 
Second Protocol.67 
The Second Protocol also specifies what constitutes serious violations 
of the Protocol and defines the conditions under which individual crimi-
nal responsibility shall apply.68 The Second Protocol imposes on its State 
Parties the obligation to adopt necessary measures to establish these vio-
lations as criminal offenses under domestic law.69 However, signifi-
                                                                                                             
That there may be placed under special protection a limited number of refuges 
intended to shelter movable cultural property in the event of armed conflict 
provided that they are situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial 
center or from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, 
such as, for example, an aerodrome, a broadcasting station, establishment en-
gaged upon work of national defense, a port or railway station of relative im-
portance or a main line of communication. 
 66. Second Protocol, supra note 63, art. 29. This fund is managed by the Committee 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict established in Ar-
ticle 24 of the Second Protocol. This Committee is composed of twelve experts who are 
qualified in the field of cultural heritage and are elected by the State Parties. The func-
tions of the Committee, set forth in Article 27, include developing guidelines for the im-
plementation of this Protocol, suspending or canceling enhanced protection for cultural 
property, and receiving and considering requests for international assistance. 
 67. Cunning, supra note 26, at 237. 
 68. Second Protocol, supra note 63, art. 15(1): 
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Protocol if that per-
son intentionally and in violation of the Convention or this Protocol commits 
any of the following acts: 
a.   Making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of 
attack; 
b.  Using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immedi-
ate surroundings in support of military action; 
c. Extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property pro-
tected under the Convention and this Protocol; 
d.  Making cultural property protected under the Convention and this 
Protocol the object of attack; 
e.  Theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism di-
rected against cultural property protected under the Convention. 
 
 69. Second Protocol, supra note 63, art. 15(2): 
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cantly, it still fails to make any uniform laws regarding the illicit traffick-
ing of cultural property, instead requiring States to create their own such 
laws.70 Thus, there is still no uniform enforcement measure. Therefore, 
the Second Protocol, although an overall improvement, remains ineffec-
tive as a means to prevent and stop the illicit trafficking of cultural prop-
erty. The Second Protocol has also struggled with ratification.71 To date, 
only twenty countries have ratified the Second Protocol, with Spain be-
ing the only Western European country, and the United States yet to even 
sign it.72 
D. UNESCO Convention 
UNESCO instituted the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cul-
tural Property in 1970 in response to a rash of antiquities thefts.73 The 
UNESCO Convention provides a framework for nations to cooperate to 
reduce the incentive for pillage of archaeological and cultural material.74 
As of March 2005, 107 countries have signed the Convention.75 The 
UNESCO Convention was designed to curb international trafficking of 
                                                                                                             
Each party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offenses under its domestic law the offenses set forth in this Article 
and to make such offenses punishable by appropriate penalties. When doing so, 
Parties shall comply with general principles of law and international law, in-
cluding the rules extending individual criminal responsibility to persons other 
than those who directly commit the act. 
 70. The Second Protocol requires: 
[E]ach Party shall adopt such legislative, administrative or disciplinary meas-
ures as may be necessary to suppress the following acts when committed inten-
tionally: 
a. any use of cultural property in violation of the Convention or this Pro-
tocol; 
b. any illicit export, other removal, or transfer of ownership of cultural  
property in violation of the Convention or this Protocol. 
 
Id. art. 21. 
 71. List of states party to the Second Protocol, http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/ 
hague/images/2plist.doc (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Lehman, supra note 42, at 538. 
 74. Id. 
 75. List of states that are parties to the UNESCO Convention, http://portal. 
unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E&order=alpha (last visited Sept. 
29, 2005). 
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national treasures and is the major international treaty for the protection 
of cultural property.76 The long term purposes of the UNESCO Conven-
tion are to protect the knowledge that can be derived from archaeological 
material that is scientifically excavated and to preserve ethnographic ma-
terial that remains in its societal context.77 The overall benefit of the in-
ternational cooperation within the Convention is a greater understanding 
of our common heritage.78 Thus it is similar to the Hague Convention in 
recognizing the importance of cultural property and heritage.79 Both 
Conventions also require that parties list the items which they believe fall 
under the definition of cultural property.80 The Hague Convention strictly 
defines the forms of cultural property that may receive enhanced protec-
tion.81 The UNESCO Convention, however, is much more open-ended, 
leaving it within the discretion of the parties to determine what property 
falls within the definition of cultural property.82 Unlike the Hague Con-
vention, however, which focuses primarily on armed conflict, the 
UNESCO Convention deals almost entirely with private conduct, mostly 
during peacetime.83 The two Conventions overlap at times, particularly at 
the conclusion of an armed conflict.84 
                                                                                                             
 76. Lehman, supra note 42, at 538. 
 77. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. (“The interchange of cultural prop-
erty among nations for its scientific, cultural, and educational purposes increases the 
knowledge of the civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires 
mutual respect and appreciation among nations.”). 
 78. Lehman, supra note 42, at 540. 
 79. Hague Convention, supra note 13, pmbl.; UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, 
pmbl. 
 80. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 1; see also Hague Convention, 
supra note 13, art. 8. 
 81. Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 8. 
 82. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 1. 
 83. Karin E. Borke, Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response 
to the Iraqi Antiquities Crisis of 2003, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 381, 410 
(2003). 
 84. Andrea Cunning discusses the relationship between the two conventions: 
The UNESCO Convention is complimentary to the 1954 Hague Convention in 
that the two documents work together to protect cultural property in time of 
peace and in the event of armed conflict. Often the two agreements overlap due 
to the fact that most claims for repatriation of cultural property are brought in 
times of peace at the conclusion of an armed conflict and many countries that 
have not provided implementing legislation for the 1954 Hague Convention 
may have implemented the UNESCO Convention regarding the return of stolen 
cultural property. 
Cunning, supra note 26, at 226. 
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The UNESCO Convention takes significant measures to prevent the il-
licit trafficking of cultural property. The Convention explicitly prohibits 
the importation of cultural property illegally exported or stolen from a 
foreign nation.85 Free-market nations are somewhat reluctant to join the 
Convention because they believe that it lacks adequate protection for 
good faith purchasers.86 The UNESCO Convention has specific obliga-
tions with regards to exporting and importing cultural objects.87 The 
Convention imposes upon exporting states the obligation to issue author-
ized certificates to show that the exported property was fully sanc-
tioned.88 Along with this certification process, the UNESCO Convention 
requires State Parties to ensure that museums within their territory do not 
acquire cultural property illegally exported from another State Party.89 
Perhaps most importantly, Article 7(b) of the Convention prohibits the 
importation of cultural property stolen from museums and other public 
monuments and institutions in another State Party, provided that such 
cultural property is documented as belonging to that particular institu-
tion.90 
                                                                                                             
 85. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 3. 
 86. Only recently did France, the United Kingdom, and Japan become State Parties. 
Borke, supra note 83, at 409. Borke explains that market nations have been slow to ac-
cede to the UNESCO Convention out of reluctance to restrict their art markets. Id. 
 87. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, arts. 6–7. 
 88. The State Parties to the UNESCO Convention undertake: 
 
a. to introduce an appropriate certificate in which the exporting State 
would specify that the export of the cultural property in question is 
authorized. The certificate should accompany all items of cultural 
property exported in accordance with the regulations; 
b. to prohibit the exportation of cultural property from their territory 
unless accompanied by the above-mentioned expert certificate; 
c. to publicize this prohibition by appropriate means, particularly 
among persons likely to export or import cultural property. 
 
Id. art. 6. 
 89. The State Parties to the UNESCO Convention agree: 
To take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent 
museums and similar institutions within their territories from acquiring cultural 
property originating in another State Party which has been illegally exported af-
ter entry into force of this Convention, in the States concerned. Whenever pos-
sible, to inform a State of origin Party to this Convention of an offer of such 
cultural property illegally removed from that State after entry into force of this 
Convention in both States.  
Id. art. 7(a).   
 90. Id. art. 7(b)(i). 
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Archaeological materials are dealt with separately in Article 9.91 How-
ever, Article 9 only envisages enhanced cooperation between State Par-
ties should a State Party’s archaeological materials be in danger of being 
pillaged.92 If an agreement is not reached, the property may not be pro-
tected under the Convention. Therefore, if cultural property is not fully 
documented as a museum or institutional piece, the UNESCO Conven-
tion does not provide an adequate mechanism to compel restitution. 
Although the UNESCO Convention represents a significant attempt to 
curtail illicit trafficking of cultural property, it falls short in its overall 
effectiveness because of a lack of uniformity in legal recourse.93 As with 
the Hague Convention, it allows states to apply their own substantive law 
regarding cultural property. This lack of uniform structure renders the 
UNESCO Convention ineffective as a means of solving the problem of 
illicit trafficking.94 
E. UNIDROIT Convention 
The third primarily international agreement in this area, the 
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
of 1995 aims to establish common legal rules for the restitution and re-
turn of cultural objects between State Parties to the Convention.95 The 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. art. 9 (“Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in 
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other 
State Parties who are affected. The State Parties to this Convention undertake, in these 
circumstances, to participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to carry 
out the necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and imports and 
international commerce in the specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each 
State concerned shall take provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irreme-
diable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State.”). 
 92. Phuong, supra note 3, at 990. 
 93. The UNESCO Convention requires states to “take necessary measures, consistent 
with national legislation.”  UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 7. Article 8 of the 
Convention requires States to impose sanctions on persons who deal with stolen cultural 
property, but does not require States to criminalize such conduct. By allowing States to 
impose their own laws, an inconsistency is created which makes combating illicit trade 
very difficult. See id. art. 8. 
 94. Lehman, supra note 42, at 541. 
 95. UNIDROIT’s purpose is to study means and methods for modernizing, harmoniz-
ing and coordinating private and in particular commercial law as between States and 
groups of States. See “Purpose” of UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/english/ 
presentation/main.htm. See also UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, pmbl. (“Deter-
mined to contribute effectively to the fight against illicit trade in cultural objects by tak-
ing the important step of establishing common, minimum legal rules for the restitution 
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fundamental tenet of the UNIDROIT Convention is that the possessor of 
stolen property should return it to the original private owner.96 The 
UNIDROIT Convention seeks to correct the failings of the UNESCO 
Convention by shifting the focus onto recipients in wealthy nations rather 
than counting on developing countries to police their own borders.97 It 
does this by creating a single harmonized source of law which requires 
any form of artifact deemed a piece of cultural property to be returned 
even if theft cannot be proven.98 Additionally, the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion enables private claims to be pursued in national legal systems.99 
Whereas the UNESCO Convention allows only State Parties to request 
restitution of stolen or illegally exported objects, the UNIDROIT Con-
vention allows private individuals to initiate restitution procedures.100 
                                                                                                             
and return of cultural objects between Contracting States, with the objective of improving 
the preservation and protection of the cultural heritage interest of all.”). 
 96. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 1: 
This Convention applies to claims of an international character for: 
a. the restitution of stolen cultural objects; 
b. the return of cultural objects removed from the territory of a 
Contracting State contrary to its law regulating the export of cul-
tural objects for the purpose of promoting its cultural heritage. 
 
 97. Lehman, supra note 42, at 543. See also Phuong, supra note 3, at 992 (“Since the 
1970 UNESCO Convention was criticized for not being sufficiently specific, UNESCO 
requested the UNIDROIT to work on a supplementary convention on stolen or illegally 
exported cultural objects.”). 
 98. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, ch. III. This provision allows a Contract-
ing State to merely claim that the object was illegally exported in order to demand its 
return. Theft need not be proven. 
 99. Under the UNIDROIT Convention: 
 
(1) A claim under Chapter II and a request under Chapter III may be brought 
before the courts or other competent authorities of the Contracting State 
where the cultural object is located, in addition to the courts or other com-
petent authorities otherwise having jurisdiction under the rules in force in 
Contracting States. 
(2) The parties may agree to submit the dispute to any court or other compe-
tent authority for arbitration. 
(3) Resort may be held to the provisional, including protective, measures 
available under the law of the Contracting State where the object is located 
even where the claim for restitution or request for return of the object is 
brought before the courts or other competent authorities of another Con-
tracting State. 
 
Id. art. 8. 
 100. Id. arts. 2, 8. 
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Another area covered by the UNIDROIT Convention which improves 
upon the UNESCO Convention concerns the trafficking of archaeologi-
cal artifacts.101 The UNIDROIT Convention covers unlawfully exca-
vated, or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained cultural objects.102 
Unlike the UNESCO Convention, it does not require museum certifica-
tion from the country of origin. Moreover, the convention provides that a 
bona fide purchaser of stolen items does not receive good title.103 Instead, 
the Convention requires that the purchaser return it, and upon return is 
entitled to “payment of fair and reasonable compensation,” provided that 
he had no knowledge of it being stolen and he exercised due diligence 
upon acquiring the object.104 Thus, there is a good faith requirement in 
purchasing cultural property. It is argued that this requirement of good 
faith will ultimately deter illicit trafficking of cultural property because 
without an act of good faith the possessor will not be compensated when 
he is required to return it.105 Therefore, the UNIDROIT Convention 
could be the most effective means of curtailing illicit trafficking because 
it establishes a common set of legal rules and extends its reach to pri-
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. art. 3. 
 102. The UNIDROIT Convention requires: 
 
(1) The possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen shall return it. 
(2) For the purposes of this Convention, a cultural object which has been 
unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall 
be considered stolen, when consistent with the law of the State where the 
excavation took place. 
(3) Any claim for restitution shall be brought within a period of three years 
from the time when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object 
and the identity of its possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty 
years from the time of the theft. 
(4) However, a claim for restitution of a cultural object forming an integral 
part of an identified monument or archaeological site, or belonging to a 
public collection, shall not be subject to time limitations other than a pe-
riod of three years from the time when the claimant knew the location of 
the cultural object and the identity of its possessor. 
 
Id. 
 103. Id. art. 4(5) (“The possessor shall not be in a more favorable position than the 
person from whom it acquired the cultural object by inheritance or otherwise gratui-
tously.”). 
 104. Id. art. 4(1). 
 105. See Lehman, supra note 42, at 547. 
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vately owned property. Unfortunately, however, only about twenty states 
have ratified this Convention.106 
III. LOOTING IN IRAQ 
Iraq, long considered the “cradle of civilization,”107 was home to many 
ancient cultures. Ancient Mesopotamia, the fertile valley of land between 
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, was inhabited by the Sumerians, Baby-
lonians, and Assyrians.108 The historical and biblical significance of the 
land and its artifacts is universal to virtually all people and religions.109 
There are over ten thousand officially registered archaeological sites 
throughout Iraq and like the National Museum, many of these sites were 
looted and pillaged, as well.110 
There is an unfortunate history of looting and destruction of cultural 
property in the Middle East. For example, after the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, there was substantial looting in Kabul in 1988 at Af-
ghanistan’s National Museum.111 Virtually all that remained was subse-
                                                                                                             
 106. List of countries that are Parties to the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Ille-
gally Exported Cultural Objects, www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.htm. 
 107. Cattan, supra note 35 (“The Tigris-Euphrates Valley is the cradle of a number of 
major civilizations, starting from the fifth millennium B.C.E., and the scene of events 
sacred to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike.”). See also John Malcolm Russell, Why 
Should We Care?, ART JOURNAL, Winter 2003, at 22–29 (“In Iraq are preserved the traces 
of the first hunter-gatherer families that roamed the Cradle of Civilization; the first vil-
lagers who invented farming and herding so they could live in one place, and the irriga-
tion so they could live almost any place; the first city dwellers who developed royalty, 
writing, and religion in order to manage their environment; the first citizens of states with 
all the complex responsibilities that citizenship entails. The ideas of city, citizen, civic 
duty, civic architecture, civilization: all these arose first in Iraq. They discovered the civi-
lization that we live today.”). 
 108. Rose, supra note 40, at 87. For a more detailed description of the ancient Mesopo-
tamian Cultures, see Andrew Lawler, Saving Iraq’s Treasures, SMITHSONIAN, June 2000, 
at 42–46, 49–55 (discussing the history of Uruk, Ashur, Babylon, Hatra, and Summarra 
and the archeological significance of each city). 
 109. Irene J. Winter, What Can be Done to Recover Iraq’s Art?, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 
2003, at B3 (writing that the looted artifacts “represent ‘our’ heritage, to the extent that 
civilization as we know it began in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and to the extent that 
events recorded in the Old Testament, sacred to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike, are 
deeply rooted in Mesopotamia.”). 
 110. Edmund L. Andrews, Iraqi Looters Tearing Up Archaeological Sites, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 2003, at A1. 
 111. Brodie, supra note 44 (“In the fighting that followed the Soviet withdrawal from 
Kabul in 1988, Afghanistan’s National Museum was ransacked. By 1996, 70 percent of 
the museum’s collections were missing and archaeological sites throughout Afghanistan 
were being devastated in the search for saleable material.”). 
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quently destroyed by the Taliban in 2001.112 Ironically, when the Iraqis 
occupied Kuwait in 1990, they quickly set up protections for museums 
and antiquities in order to steal for themselves.113 The aftermath of the 
Gulf War created a thriving international market for Iraqi antiquities. The 
sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War114 made resources scarce 
and left museums and archaeological sites open to theft.115 Despite warn-
ings by many international cultural experts to heed the lessons learned 
from previous incidents,116 large-scale looting occurred at major muse-
ums, libraries, archives and other archaeological centers when the United 
States invaded Baghdad in April 2003.117 A prominent warning was is-
sued by the Archaeological Institute of America, urging the government 
                                                                                                             
 112. Cunning details the damage inflicted by the Taliban regime: 
First, human figures in pictures were painted over. Then . . . the authorities or-
dered the destruction of all statues and non-Islamic shrines. The dynamiting of 
the huge Buddhas at Bamiyan seized most of the world’s attention. But Taliban 
officials also vandalized the museum, smashing the remains of the collection 
with hammers and axes. 
Cunning, supra note 26, at 233. 
 113. Brodie, supra note 44. 
 114. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 6, 1990). See John Daniszewski, An-
tiquities Theft in Iraq Threatens Legacy to World, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at A1 (dis-
cussing how sanctions in Iraq let left the Iraqi economy in a “downward spiral, and Iraqis 
are selling whatever they own just to survive . . . jewelry, rugs and furniture, along with 
antiquities and artwork, have flooded bazaars and been taken out of the country in huge 
quantities.”). 
 115. Phuong, supra note 3, at 989. 
 116. Guy Gugliotta, Pentagon Was Told Of Risk to Museums; US Urged to Save Iraq’s 
Historic Artifacts, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2003, at A19. Gugliotta discusses the effect of 
the first Gulf War on looting in Iraq: 
[Scholars] were especially concerned because of the example provided by the 
1991 Gulf War. Allied forces had scrupulously avoided targeting Iraqi cultural 
sites during the bombing of Baghdad twelve years ago—one attack put only a 
shrapnel dent in the National Museum’s front door even as it leveled a tele-
communications facility across the street. The end of that war kicked off a loot-
ing rampage, and eventually allowed systematic smuggling to develop. Arti-
facts from inadequately guarded sites were dug up and hauled away during the 
twelve years between the wars. 
Id. 
 117. Baghdad fell to Coalition forces on April 9, 2003. The majority of the looting at 
the National Museum occurred during April 10–11. Cattan, supra note 35 (describing 
looting at the National Museum in Baghdad, as well as many other homes of cultural 
heritage, such as the National Archives, the Manuscripts Centre, and the Baghdad li-
brary). 
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to “observe international treaties on cultural property, to work to mini-
mize damage to archaeological sites and artifacts, to prevent looting, and 
to facilitate the preservation of Iraqi Cultural Heritage in the wake of any 
conflict.”118 The United States, however, did little during the invasion to 
protect cultural property in Iraq.119 
The National Museum in Baghdad, an archaeological museum, was for 
eighty years a depository for thousands of artifacts and manuscripts.120 
Many archeological objects were kept in five storerooms in the Museum, 
three of which were subject to significant looting.121 The items in these 
rooms are among those missing, and because they were not previously 
catalogued, it is extremely difficult to know exactly what has been 
                                                                                                             
 118. Borke, supra note 83, at 399. Additionally, there was also a warning given by 
members of the United States Presidential Advisory Committee on Cultural Property. 
Phuong, supra note 3, at 985 (“US army news briefing held a few days before the looting 
took place indicates that US forces knew perfectly well that the Iraqi National Museum 
would be a prime target for looters.”). The Archaeological Institute of America repeated 
their pleas for the coalition forces to protect the museum and the archaeological sites the 
day before the looting began in an April 9, 2003 letter. The letter reads: 
We therefore call upon Coalition forces to provide immediate security, where 
necessary, for museums and major archaeological sites; to make public state-
ments condemning the looting of sites and museums and warning that cultural 
objects removed from Iraq are stolen property; and, where necessary, to make 
appropriate shows of force to stop looting. 
See Letter from Archaeological Institute to Officials in the Department of State, the De-
partment of Defense, the White House, and the Military (Apr. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/home/Letter04-09.pdf. 
 119. The Iraqis, however, did take precautions, particularly at the National Museum in 
Baghdad. Prior to the war, the museum staff moved many of the most valuable pieces 
into bank vaults and other hidden safe locations. The only items that remained in the 
gallery were those that were too large or too fragile to remove or were permanently at-
tached to a display. John Malcolm Russell, We’re Still Missing the Looting Picture, 
WASH. POST, June 15, 2003, at B05. 
 120. Lawler, supra note 108, at 42. John Malcolm Russell provides a description of the 
importance of the Museum: 
The Iraq Museum is a national archaeological museum, which means every-
thing excavated in Iraq goes there. Many of these objects, found in houses, 
temples, palaces, graves, farms, towns and cities, and left behind by people 
long dead who survive only in these traces, were of equal importance to those 
on display. 
Russell, supra note 119, at B5. 
 121. Russell, supra note 119, at B5. 
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lost.122 The more high profile objects that were stolen from the Museum 
were the Warka Vase, a sacred limestone piece from Uruk, a marble head 
of Poseidon, and an Assyrian ivory carving.123 The Warka Vase and the 
accompanying marble face of a woman were subsequently returned.124 
The looting was described by United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan as “a wound inflicted to all mankind.”125 The United States’ first 
response was to issue an amnesty program which allowed the return of 
any items looted, no questions asked.126 The amnesty program was a suc-
cess from the start.127 By September 2003, the United States military re-
ported that 3,411 items were recovered, 1,700 of which were returned 
under the amnesty program. However, 10,000 items were still missing.128 
Although it was later discovered that initial figures of looted objects 
from the National Museum were inflated,129 an even greater tragedy oc-
curred in southern Iraq, where countless archaeological sites were pil-
laged.130 This looting continues today, as there are many recently re-
ported incidents of unsanctioned excavations where thieves are stealing 
priceless artifacts.131 Regardless of the success of recovering stolen mu-
                                                                                                             
 122. This problem will be discussed in detail below. The UNESCO Convention does 
little to protect artifacts and other cultural property that is not certified by the State from 
which they came. 
 123. Lawler, supra note 108. 
 124. Rose, supra note 40, at 86 (“The Warka Vase was returned on June 12 after three 
unidentified Iraqis drove up to the museum and pulled it out, wrapped in a blanket, from 
the trunk of their car. The men, who were not interrogated, were thanked and allowed to 
leave.”). The Lady of Warka sculpture was returned after having circulated among five 
potential Iraqi sellers. Atwood, supra note 5, at B2 (writing that the last would-be Iraqi 
seller was “frustrated at his inability to find a buyer, buried it in an orchard, where it was 
retrieved after American investigators received a tip-off.”). 
 125. Cattan, supra note 35, at 71. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Bogdanos Investigation, supra note 6 (describing how the program has been 
“enormously successful”). 
 128. Gugliotta, supra note 116, at A19. See also Bogdanos Investigation, supra note 6. 
 129. Atwood, supra note 5. 
 130. Russell, supra note 119, at B5 (arguing that, “[B]y far the greatest cultural disas-
ter occurred in Southern Iraq, where looters plundered major archaeological sites.”). 
 131. Russell discusses the extent of the looting occurring throughout Iraq: 
Ambassador Pietro Cordone, whom the Americans have appointed senior advi-
sor to the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, took a helicopter tour throughout the south 
that revealed the extent of the destruction. At site after site, he observed dozens, 
and sometimes hundreds, of illegal diggers systematically turning the ground 
inside out, recovering objects favored by the export market, discarding every-
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seum pieces, the pillaging of these archaeological sites represents a trag-
edy of enormous proportions.132 The United States’ and its allies’ con-
tinuing failure to protect these sites from looters has also been com-
pounded by accusations of damage inflicted by coalition military equip-
ment.133 The China Daily proclaimed: “It is immoral for the United 
States to destroy Iraq’s culture while trying to rebuild the country eco-
nomically and politically. The self-proclaimed ‘liberators’ cannot escape 
worldwide criticism at a time when UNESCO is launching a strong cam-
paign across the world to protect endangered cultural heritages.”134 
Claims that the archaeological and cultural property was better protected 
under Saddam Hussein’s regime were also made.135 Even if the archaeo-
logical items were to be recovered, a concern is that looters destroy the 
                                                                                                             
thing else. In the process, everything of real value about these objects, is de-
stroyed, their stories lost forever. 
Id. Atwood also describes the widespread looting at archaeological sites he witnessed: 
Every ancient site I saw in Iraq last year was under assault. At the biblical city 
of Nimrud, I saw where professional looters had chiseled out carvings decorat-
ing the imposing stone walls of the palace of King Ashurnasirpal II. Those 
pieces have disappeared, sold into the illicit antiquities market and presumably 
now sitting in some collector’s room. 
Atwood, supra note 5. 
 132. Id. (“Reports suggest the pillaging has since grown much worse. The buried re-
mains of the 4,000 year old Sumerian City of Isin have been turned upside down by hun-
dreds of illegal diggers.”). 
 133. An article from Australia, Iraq’s Invaders Accused of Crimes Against Antiquities, 
WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 7, 2004, at 25, details complaints made by Iraqi officials: 
Interim cultural minister Mofeed al-Jazeeri, fed up with Polish forces stationed 
at Babylon . . . renewed accusations that they were causing irreparable harm to 
valuable sites and urged them to leave . . . . “We have received information that 
damage has been done to several archaeological sites . . . . Just their presence, 
with their heavy equipment, is harmful in and of itself.” 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (quoting Al-Jazeera: “Large parts of [ancient Babylon] were reconstructed and 
restored to its former glory by Iraq’s former president Saddam Hussein in an attempt to 
restore ancient historical sites preserving Iraq’s rich and diverse history.”). See also 
Eagar, supra note 12 (quoting Sarah Collins, a curator with the Ancient Near East De-
partment of the British Museum who worked with the Baghdad Museum for several 
months during the amnesty program, “Looting wasn’t a problem under Saddam. He be-
headed a couple of looters and that put a stop to it.”). But see Daniszewski, supra note 
114 (describing widespread looting and plundering throughout Iraq after the Gulf War 
and the inability of the government to control such pillaging). 
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ability of scientists to gain contextualized archaeological information.136 
Iraq’s oldest cities—Nineveh, Uruk, Isin—are being robbed, and, unlike 
catalogued items at the National Museum, there are no inventories to 
determine what priceless treasures have been stolen.137 
IV. UNESCO AND INTERPOL RESPOND TO THE LOOTING 
Immediately after the major looting occurred in April 2003, UNESCO, 
Interpol, and the United States took action to prevent the illicit traffick-
ing of the stolen goods and to prevent further looting.138 The plan in-
cluded embargoing sales of Iraqi artifacts, encouraging their return, cre-
ating an inventory of lost artifacts, locating the stolen objects and at-
tempting to repair the damaged ones.139 A significant impediment to the 
recovery and return of stolen Iraqi cultural property is the uncertainty 
about what was stolen and what remains.140 Realizing this, the United 
States, UNESCO, and other international organizations began creating an 
inventory of the artifacts at the museum.141 However, because a great 
deal of the artifacts which were stolen were not previously catalogued, it 
is virtually impossible to make a definitive list.142 Of course, this prob-
lem does not take into account the massive looting that occurred, and 
continues to occur, at countless archaeological sites through Iraq, where 
artifacts are also not catalogued. 
                                                                                                             
 136. Borke, supra note 83, at 403. 
 137. Eagar, supra note 12, at 4. 
 138. Rose, supra note 40 (“Scholars, curators, UNESCO, Interpol and U.S. investiga-
tors, among others, immediately scrambled to launch perhaps the largest treasure hunt the 
world has ever known.”). 
 139. Lawler, supra note 108. 
 140. The Bogdanos Investigation discusses the importance of addressing this diffi-
culty: 
Foremost among the challenges has been identifying exactly what is missing. In 
part, this is because of the sheer size of the museum’s collection and because 
the museum’s storage rooms contained not only catalogued items, but also 
items from various excavation sites that had not yet been catalogued. 
Bogdanos Investigation, supra note 6. 
 141. UNESCO and Interpol reinforced their cooperation in the fight against illicit traf-
fic in Iraqi cultural properties by signing an amendment to their Cooperation Agreement 
of 1999. The amendment laid the groundwork for establishing and compiling a database 
on cultural property stolen in Iraq. UNESCO.org, UNESCO and Interpol Reinforce Co-
operation in Fight Against Traffic in Iraqi Cultural Goods, http://portal.unesco. 
org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13501&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 142. Bogdanos Investigation, supra note 6. 
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UNESCO also attempted to implement immediate legislation that 
would help recover stolen cultural property from Iraq.143 Realizing that 
there are many countries that are not parties to the UNESCO Convention, 
it pressed the Secretary General and the Security Council to pass a reso-
lution binding all states to its provisions.144 On May 22, 2003, the United 
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1483.145 Since the Resolu-
tion was adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it is 
binding on all member states. There are two significant aspects of Reso-
lution 1483. The first is that it extends to all objects stolen from Iraq 
since 1990, not only those stolen during 2003. The second is that Resolu-
tion 1483 calls upon member states to establish a prohibition not just on 
stolen items, but also those that are reasonably suspected of being sto-
len.146 
UNESCO has also sent missions to Iraq to assess the situation147 and 
has created the International Coordination Committee for the Safeguard-
ing of the Cultural Heritage in Iraq (ICC).148 The ICC met over a two day 
                                                                                                             
 143. Phuong, supra note 3, at 992. 
 144. Id. Phuong translates a speech by Mounir Bachenaki, the Assistant Director-
General for Culture of UNESCO: 
There are many countries that are not parties to the 1970 Convention and this is 
the reason why we thought that, even for a temporary period, a decision that is 
taken for all States, even those that have not signed the 1970 Convention, 
would allow us to fight more efficiently against the import of objects from Iraq. 
Id. 
 145. S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (“All Member States 
shall take appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural 
property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and reli-
gious importance illegally removed from the Iraq National Museum, the National Li-
brary, and other locations in Iraq since the adoption of Resolution 661 (1990), including 
by establishing a prohibition on trade in or transfer of such items and items with respect 
to which reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed, and calls 
upon UNESCO, Interpol, and other international organizations, as appropriate, to assist in 
the implementation of this paragraph.”). 
 146. This was done to cast a wider net in catching all artifacts looted from Iraq and to 
stifle trade even further. 
 147. UNESCO sent two missions in May and June of 2003 to examine the situation in 
Iraq. UNESCO.org, Iraqi Cultural Heritage: Second Mission to Iraq, http://portal. 
unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13199&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. 
html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 148. UNESCO.org, International Coordination Committee for the Safeguarding of the 
Cultural Heritage in Iraq: Seven Recommendations, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=20649&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Sept. 
29, 2005) (“Established under the joint auspices of the Iraqi authorities and UNESCO, 
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period in late May of 2004, and issued a series of seven recommenda-
tions.149 The most important of these recommendations was to 
“[c]oordinate international action and channel international aid—both 
bilateral and multilateral—with a view to ensure the implementation of 
the strategy for the safeguarding of the cultural heritage in Iraq and as-
sess its overall monitoring.”150 
Interpol has also made significant efforts to recover cultural property 
looted from Iraq. Interpol has created the Interpol Tracking Task Force to 
Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq (ITTF).151 The 
ITTF’s main focus is on the dissemination and centralization of informa-
tion relating to the Iraqi cultural property crisis in order to more effec-
tively pursue law enforcement.152 Interpol has also held a Regional Meet-
ing to Fight the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property Stolen From Iraq 
in Amman, Jordan on June 1–2, 2004.153 The meeting was well attended 
by delegates from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.154 The 
Regional Meeting proposed a series of recommendations, perhaps the 
most important of which was the recommendation that countries that 
have not yet signed the UNESCO Convention and the UNIDROIT Con-
vention should do so as soon as possible.155 
Progress toward recovering stolen Iraqi cultural property has been 
made. At a conference in June 2004, Iraq’s General of Museums, Donny 
George, stated that through coordinated efforts by government and law 
enforcement agencies in the sixteen months following the looting of the 
National Museum some 5,200 pieces out of 13,000 had been recovered 
in six countries.156 In Iraq itself, more than 3,000 objects have been 
seized or returned to the museum.157 Additionally, in the United States, 
                                                                                                             
the Committee aims to provide appropriate coordination for all activities to protect the 
Iraqi cultural heritage . . . it is composed of 25 international experts.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. UNESCO.org, Iraq Task Force—Recommendations, http://www.interpol.org/ 
public/WorkOfArt/Iraq/Iraqtaskforce/1stmeetingrecommand.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). The ITTF has held two meetings. The first was held in Lyon, France on November 
12–13, 2003. The second was held in Amman, Jordon, May 30–31, 2004. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Regional Meeting to Fight the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property Stolen from 
Iraq, Minutes, http://www.interpol.int/Public/WorkofArt/Iraq/meetings/Minutes200406. 
asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Atwood, supra note 5. 
 157. Id. 
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roughly 600 antiquities known or suspected of being from Iraq have been 
recovered in airports.158 
V. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CONVENTIONS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO 
IRAQ 
A. 1954 Hague Convention and Iraq 
Immediately following the looting of the Iraqi National Museum, the 
United States forces were heavily criticized for failing to prevent the in-
cident.159 Warnings had been given to the U.S. military and past experi-
ences indicated that such looting was likely.160 To what extent, however, 
can the United States be held legally responsible for the wide-scale loot-
ing? What were its obligations under international law to prevent the 
looting of the Museum and the subsequent looting of archeological sites 
throughout Iraq? 
The United States is a party to the 1907 Hague Convention which pro-
vides that damage to cultural or historical property should be avoided 
during military campaigns.161 Since the United States did not damage any 
of the Museums directly, it cannot be held responsible under this conven-
tion.162 The 1954 Hague Convention, the most significant treaty relating 
to cultural property during an armed conflict, is also inapplicable to the 
present conflict. Unfortunately, the United States, along with the United 
Kingdom, are not parties to the Convention.163 Some scholars argue, 
however, that the 1954 Hague Convention has become a part of interna-
tional customary law.164 One commentator argues that Article 4(3) of the 
1954 Hague Convention has reached customary status because it is “es-
                                                                                                             
 158. Id. 
 159. See Paul Richard, Bush Panel Members Quit Over Looting; Cultural Advisors Say 
U.S. Military Could Have Prevented Museum Losses, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2003, at C1. 
 160. Many museums and archaeological sites were extensively looted during the first 
Gulf War. Id. Richard Moe, president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation 
wrote to Secretary of State Colin. L. Powell to urge the United States to safeguard the 
collections at the Iraqi National Museum. Id. 
 161. See List of 114 State Parties to the Hague Convention, supra note 56. 
 162. There have been no claims to date that the United States military, or any member 
of its Coalition, has directly damaged any museums in Iraq. 
 163. See List of 114 State Parties to the Hague Convention, supra note 56. The United 
Kingdom, however, is taking steps to become a party to the Convention. Phuong, supra 
note 3, at 988 (“The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport recently announced 
to the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport that the UK 
intends to become a party to the Convention and its second Protocol.”). 
 164. See Phuong, supra note 3, at 987; see also Keane, supra note 23, at 21–22. 
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sentially an elaboration of the general obligation under international law 
for an occupying force to maintain law and order in the territory it occu-
pies, as provided in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.”165 Addi-
tionally, the United States itself, during the 1991 Gulf War, acted in ac-
cordance with the general principles of the 1954 Hague Convention 
when they avoided attacking any cultural sites.166 The most significant 
indicator that at least part of the 1954 Hague Convention may be a part 
of customary international law came out of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which explicitly ruled that 
Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention had been incorporated into the 
customary law of war.167 
The United States, however, would not be in violation of international 
law regardless of whether the 1954 Hague Convention has attained cus-
tomary status. Colonel Bogdanos’168 report reveals that United States 
                                                                                                             
 165. Phuong, supra note 3, at 987. 
 166. Cunning describes how the United States, through its actions, complied with the 
1954 Hague Convention: 
In the Gulf War, the United States and Coalition forces were faced with the de-
cision of whether to attack an Iraqi military target which was intentionally situ-
ated by the Sumerian temple, a historic building. The decision was made that 
the target should only be attacked if it was an absolute necessity so the temple 
would not suffer any collateral damage. Although the Coalition forces were not 
bound by the obligations of the 1954 Hague Convention, they acted in accor-
dance with it, and they recognized the Convention as “an advisory document.” 
Cunning, supra note 26, at 228. 
 167. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 19 (“In the event of an armed conflict 
not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.”); 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 98 (Oct. 2, 1995) (“The emergence of international rules 
governing internal strife has occurred at two different levels: at the level of customary 
law and that of treaty law. Two bodies of rules have thus crystallized, which are by no 
means conflicting or inconsistent, but instead mutually support and supplement each 
other. Indeed, the interplay between these two sets of rules is such that some treaty rules 
have gradually become part of customary law. This holds true for common Article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Convention, as was authoritatively held by the International Court of 
Justice (Nicaragua Case, at 218), but also applies to Article 19 of the Hague Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 
1954.”). 
 168. Colonel Matthew Bogdanos was the head of a fourteen man task force to investi-
gate the looting at the Iraq Museum in April 2003. Paul Sullivan, Lunch with FT, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at 14. 
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forces were unable to secure the Museum because these forces “became 
engaged in intense combat with Iraqi forces fighting from the museum 
grounds and from a nearby Special Republican Guard compound.”169 
That U.S. forces were under fire from the Museum vicinity justifies their 
alleged inaction with regard to the prevention of looting. Additionally, 
since Iraq is a party to the 1954 Hague Convention, its military was un-
der an obligation not to use the Museum or any other culturally signifi-
cant site for military purposes.170 
The United States, as well as the United Kingdom and other allies, 
should sign and become parties to the 1954 Hague Convention and its 
Second Protocol. Although it is clear from past actions that United States 
military forces generally follow the provisions of the Convention,171 it 
will still be beneficial to both the United States and the world if the 
United States was to ratify it. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the inva-
sion of Iraq will be the last military intervention exercised by the United 
State and its allies. The United States may bring further military action in 
the Middle East, where virtually all nations have a large amount of an-
cient cultural property. Ratifying the 1954 Hague Convention and com-
plying with its provisions will go a long way in preventing future inci-
dents of damage to cultural property and help the United States win 
popular support for its actions. 
B. UNESCO Convention, UNIDROIT Convention and Iraq 
The UNESCO Convention, providing for the restitution of stolen cul-
tural property not only during armed conflict but also during times of 
peace,172 would be the most applicable instrument for the recovery of the 
stolen Iraqi items. Many countries and organizations cite the UNESCO 
Convention as a means of recovering the cultural property from Iraq.173 
The need for more states to join the UNESCO Convention is based on 
                                                                                                             
 169. See Bogdanos Investigation, supra note 6; see also Trofimov, supra note 3 (re-
porting that U.S. forces were unable to secure the Museum until April 16 because there 
was an Iraqi army trench in the Museum’s front lawn). 
 170. See Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 4(1) (“The High Contracting Parties 
undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within 
the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property 
and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes 
which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and 
by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property.”). 
 171. See Cunning, supra note 26, at 228. 
 172. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. 
 173. See Regional Meeting to Fight the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property Stolen 
from Iraq, supra note 153. 
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the premise that restitution of cultural property is not considered to be a 
part of customary international law.174 Western nations have been reluc-
tant to incorporate such restitution into customary law because these 
states have removed many items from countries which they have colo-
nized or occupied and do not want to return them.175 Therefore, the only 
way to require states to participate in the restitution process is if they are 
State Parties to the UNESCO Convention. 
The United States, United Kingdom, and Iraq are all parties to the 
UNESCO Convention.176 After initial reservations, the United States be-
came a State Party to the UNESCO Convention in 1983 with the adop-
tion of the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
(CPIA).177 The United Kingdom became a State Party only recently in 
2002.178 The late ratification allowed the United Kingdom to become a 
very attractive place for smugglers to sell stolen art items because there 
was no requirement for a British art dealer to see a valid exportation cer-
tificate.179 Iraq, however, became a State Party very early on, ratifying 
the UNESCO Convention in 1973.180 
                                                                                                             
 174. Because the restitution of cultural property is not recognized under customary 
international law, the only way for such restitution to be enforced is through the creation 
and enforcement of treaties. 
 175. Phuong discusses the reluctance of Western nations to join the UNESCO Conven-
tion: 
There is no general obligation of restitution of cultural property in customary 
international law, mainly because Western countries have removed a high 
number of items from the countries which they had colonized and/or temporar-
ily occupied and do not wish to return them. Instead, international obligations 
to return cultural property can be found in treaties which often cover only cer-
tain items and are subject to some conditions. 
Phuong, supra note 3, at 989. 
 176. List of states that are parties to the UNESCO Convention, supra note 75. 
 177. Borke, supra note 83, at 407–08 (“The United States has historically resisted in-
ternational pressure to broaden restrictions on the importation of art from foreign coun-
tries.”  After lobbying for a change in language from the original 1969 draft of the Con-
vention, “[t]he Senate approved the revised UNESCO Convention. . . . The United States 
ratified [i]t in 1972 and formally implemented it through legislation in 1983, becoming 
the first market nation to do so.”). The legislation that implemented the Convention was 
the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA) signed on January 12, 
1983. The Act codified Articles 7(b) and 9 of the UNESCO Convention into U.S. law. Id. 
at 410. 
 178. List of states that are parties to the UNESCO Convention, supra note 75. 
 179. Phuong, supra note 3, at 991. 
 180. List of states that are parties to the UNESCO Convention, supra note 75. 
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Unfortunately, regardless of membership, the UNESCO Convention is 
inadequate to properly deal with the current crisis in Iraq. The Conven-
tion may have been helpful considering Iraq is a State party. However, 
there is confusion over whether the Coalition Provisional Authority had 
power to act under that capacity or whether the newly installed Iraqi 
government is still able to act as a State Party.181 A determination of the 
new government’s status with relation to international treaties and con-
ventions must be made. Even assuming that the Iraqi government could 
act as a State Party to the Convention, there are limits and glaring defi-
ciencies within the Convention itself that make its application here prob-
lematic. The most significant problem involves the identification of the 
items that were stolen from the National Museum,182 and the further dif-
ficulties of identifying those unmarked items taken from countless ar-
chaeological sites. Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention provides that 
State Parties must prohibit the importation of cultural property stolen 
from museums in other State Parties provided that such cultural property 
is documented as belonging to that institution.183 Therefore, it will be 
difficult to recover the thousands of undocumented items that were stolen 
from the storage rooms at the Museum, and virtually impossible to re-
cover the cultural property taken from the archaeological sites. Addition-
ally, there are enormous procedural steps that are imposed by the Con-
vention that will be difficult for the new government in Iraq to imple-
ment.184 
The UNIDROIT Convention, created to address some of the shortcom-
ings of the UNESCO Convention,185 is unfortunately inapplicable to the 
present situation. Neither Iraq, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
                                                                                                             
 181. If Iraq is not considered to be a State Party to the Convention then it will be un-
able to seek restitution of stolen cultural items in the United States. Without a formal 
government, Iraq is unable to meet the first requirement of the CPIA, that the government 
of a State Party must make a formal request for the imposition of import restrictions. See 
Borke, supra note 83, at 426. Borke also writes that “[i]t is also debatable whether Iraq, 
absent a formal government, legally remains a State Party to the Convention. Further-
more, Iraq will not be able to satisfy the CPIA requirement that it ‘has taken measures 
consistent with the Convention to protect its cultural property.’”  Id. 
 182. See Bogdanos Investigation, supra note 6 (“Foremost among the challenges has 
been identifying exactly what has been missing.”). 
 183. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(b). 
 184. Phuong, supra note 3, at 991 (“The Convention itself has some shortcomings 
because it mainly relies on cumbersome procedures which require the setting up of new 
administrative structures in order, for instance, to implement the certification system.”). 
 185. Lehman, supra note 42, at 543. 
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nor any other Western free-market nation is a party to the UNIDROIT 
Convention.186 
V. RESOLUTION 1483 AND DOMESTIC LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, passed on May 
22, 2003,187 may be the most hopeful prospect for the restitution of Iraqi 
cultural property. The Resolution states that “all Member States shall 
take appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return . . . of Iraqi cultural 
property” which includes “establishing a prohibition on trade in or trans-
fer of such items.”188 Resolution 1483 essentially requires all Member 
States to implement legislation in order to curb the illicit trade of stolen 
cultural property from Iraq.189 
In the United Kingdom, the Iraq Order 2003, adopted to implement 
Resolution 1483, prohibits the import or export of any item illegally re-
moved from Iraq.190 Switzerland, notoriously known as a market for il-
licit sales of artifacts,191 feeling pressured by Resolution 1483, finally 
ratified the UNESCO Convention in October 2003.192 The United States 
has proposed legislation in an attempt to close loopholes and remedy in-
adequacies in its domestic law even before the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1483.193 The Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act was intro-
                                                                                                             
 186. List of countries that are parties to the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Ille-
gally Exported Cultural Objects, supra note 106. 
 187. S.C. Resolution 1483, supra note 145. 
 188. Id. para. 7. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Phoung describes how the Iraq Order 2003 operates: 
It creates two offenses with regard to stolen Iraqi cultural property. First, any-
one who holds or controls a stolen Iraqi cultural item must transfer it to the po-
lice. If he does not, he is guilty of an offense of omission under Article 8(2). 
Secondly, anyone dealing with a stolen Iraqi item is also guilty of an offense 
under Article 8(3). 
Phuong, supra note 3, at 993. See also Atwood, supra note 5 (“[The British] enacted 
legislation, that for the first time, made it a crime to buy or sell illegally excavated or 
removed antiquities in that country, whatever the origin. Officials in [the United King-
dom] had talked about these changes for years, but the “Baghdad disaster proved the 
impetus” to making them a reality.”). 
 191. The civil laws in Switzerland, which favor innocent purchasers, have created a 
legal loophole, allowing for the “laundering” of large quantities of stolen cultural prop-
erty. Borke, supra note 83, at 390 (“Switzerland, in particular has a thriving market in 
cultural material and objects bought there can be sold legitimately in the U.K. or U.S.”). 
 192. Atwood, supra note 5. 
 193. See Borke, supra note 83. 
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duced on May 7, 2003, in the House of Representatives.194 The bill pro-
poses to “provide for the recovery, restitution, and protection of the cul-
tural heritage of Iraq” by imposing a restriction on all “archaeological” 
and “cultural” material removed from Iraq after August 2, 1990.195 The 
Senate proposed its own piece of legislation on June 19, 2003, the Emer-
gency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2003,196 allowing 
the President to impose importation restrictions on all archaeological and 
cultural property from Iraq without Iraq having to make a formal re-
quest.197 Thus, the bill circumvents the problem of whether Iraq has re-
tained its rights and capabilities under the UNESCO Convention and the 
CPIA.198 Additionally, the bill defines the materials that may be pro-
tected more broadly than the CPIA does, and includes all materials of 
“archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific or religious impor-
tance.”199 The House and Senate eventually passed a bill, the Emergency 
Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004,200 on November 19, 
2004 and it was signed into law by President George W. Bush.201 The 
passage of this bill will undoubtedly make it easier to stop trafficking of 
illegally seized cultural property from Iraq by heightening the standards 
at the borders and allowing for the CPIA to be enacted without a formal 
Iraqi request. More States must recognize the importance of passing new 
legislation that allows them to tighten borders and waive certain stringent 
requirements of the UNESCO Convention. 
                                                                                                             
 194. Iraqi Cultural Heritage Protection Act, H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 195. Id. 
 196. The Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2003, S. 1291, 
108th Cong. (2003). 
 197. Id. 
 198. By waiving the requirement that Iraq make a formal request before the President 
can impose import restrictions pursuant to his authority under section 2603 of the CPIA, 
the proposed legislation effectively eliminates the question of whether Iraq has a func-
tioning recognizable government for the purposes of international interaction. 
 199. S. 1291, supra note 196. 
 200. The Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004, H.R. 1047, 
108th Cong. (2004). 
 201. Press Release, Archaeological Institute of America, President Signs Emergency 
Protection Act for Iraqi Antiquities Act (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www. 
archacal.org/pdfs/archaeologywatch/Iraq/AIAPR_Iraqi_Antiquities_Act.pdf?page=10248  
(“With this legislation the President may exercise his authority under the Cultural Prop-
erty Implementation Act . . . without the need for Iraq to bring a request to the U.S. for 
import restrictions. . . . The legislation tracks the United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 1483, which requires all members . . . to prevent trade in cultural materials illegally 
removed from museums and other locations in Iraq.”). 
322 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:1 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Cultural heritage is the hallmark of humanity, the identity of civiliza-
tions, and the one thing common to all peoples. The continued looting 
and destruction of cultural property in Iraq is an all too common tragedy. 
Although the effects of armed conflict have destroyed cultural property 
for centuries, the international community has not been successful in 
preventing such incidents. 
The current conventions in place to protect cultural property are inade-
quate to deal with the situation in Iraq. This inadequacy stems from a 
lack of commitment from States to become part of these agreements and 
make serious efforts to protect cultural property. Countries such as the 
United States and United Kingdom should sign and become State Parties 
to the 1954 Hague Convention because they are, unfortunately, likely to 
engage in future military interventions. These military operations may 
occur in the Middle East where, similar to Iraq, many nations are rich in 
cultural property. The realities of armed conflict, however, require mili-
tary commanders to place a premium on lives above property. Minimum 
standards can still be observed during armed conflict; ratifying the 1954 
Hague Convention and acting within its provisions will help to ensure 
that future incidents do not occur. Showing the world that they are seri-
ous about the protection of cultural property and sensitive to cultural 
heritage overall will help the United States and United Kingdom gain 
much needed global support. 
The end of looting in Iraq and the return of pillaged goods will take 
time. Fortunately, UNESCO, Interpol, and most countries throughout the 
world have recognized the problem and are doing all they can to return 
the items and develop ways to prevent future incidents.202 The most im-
portant thing that must be done is to ensure that all States have imple-
mented the necessary domestic legislation to comply with Security 
Council Resolution 1483. The problem of illicit trafficking can best be 
addressed at the domestic level, particularly at the borders. There has 
                                                                                                             
 202. The United Nations announced on October 27, 2004, the creation of a new rapid 
reaction task force to step in wherever cultural property is threatened during times of 
armed conflict and national disaster. The group, called “the cultural blue berets,” will 
initially be formed entirely of Italians, because of their artistic expertise. Under the terms 
of the plan, the government of the affected country will first contact UNESCO. If offi-
cials in Paris judge the case to be sufficiently serious and urgent, they will then contact 
Rome who will set up an ad-hoc team to be dispatched to the location. John Hooper, 
UNESCO’s ‘Blue Berets’ to Rescue Cultural Treasures, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 28, 
2004. 
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already been a great deal of success,203 particularly in the United States, 
where roughly six hundred antiquities known or suspected of being 
smuggled from Iraq have been recovered.204 The media attention and 
worldwide outrage over the looting at the National Museum in Baghdad  
provides an unprecedented opportunity for the nations of the world to 
address the problem in a constructive manner. Hopefully, the world can 
learn from the tragedy in Iraq and strive to promote respect and protec-
tion for the cultural heritage of all mankind. 
 
               Joshua M. Zelig* 
 
                                                                                                             
 203. Atwood, supra note 5 (“[G]overnments have adopted the kinds of measures that 
advocates of cultural patrimony have been urging for years—and they got results. Italy 
has confiscated on its soil more than 300 pieces looted from the Baghdad museum. Syria 
has confiscated 200.”). Jordan has also confiscated a large number of pieces. Id. 
 204. One high profile case involving an American expert on Iraq’s postwar reconstruc-
tion, Joseph Braude, settled in U.S. District Court in New York on November 22, 2004. 
Braude was sentenced to six months for trying to smuggle into the United States 4,000-
year-old artifacts stolen from Iraq’s National Museum. Braude was stopped by customs 
agents at John F. Kennedy Airport after he failed to declare that he was carrying three 
ancient marble and alabaster seals. Scholar Sentenced in Artifact Smuggling, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 23, 2004, at 9. 
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